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Abstract 
 
This paper applies the marketing strategy literature to the four phases of the intermodal terminal 
life cycle (ITLC) to identify the appropriate competitive strategy to be undertaken at each 
phase, based on fluctuating markets and competitor behaviour. Not only can applying the 
correct strategy at each phase help to obtain a competitive advantage, but anticipating future 
strategies in advance can underpin the success of current strategies and ensure that both public 
and private stakeholders are prepared for future challenges. 
 
The paper derives the appropriate strategies, provides empirical examples and discusses the 
opportunities and challenges inherent in each strategy. The paper concludes with suggestions 
for future research on strategy options that go beyond the traditional view of terminals as 
homogeneous interchangeable assets. Rather than simple improvement of factor conditions by 
investing in the infrastructure, innovative strategies to obtain competitive advantage should 
focus on partnerships with external stakeholders such as rail operators, 3PLs and shippers. 
 
Key words: marketing strategy; business model; governance; intermodal freight transport; 
intermodal terminal; product life cycle 
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1. Introduction 
Research on intermodal transport operations and policy goals of modal shift from road to 
rail are based on certain assumptions and contexts which change throughout the life cycle of 
the terminal. Moreover, the accuracy of these assumptions depends on the interdependent 
relations between key stakeholders in the intermodal sector, for example the business model of 
the terminal, the KPIs and fees agreed in the terminal concession, the relationship between 
terminal operator and rail operators using the terminal and operational issues of wagon and 
locomotive management. 
Monios and Bergqvist (2016a) applied the product life cycle (PLC) to intermodal terminals  
in order to establish a life cycle framework for situating analysis of intermodal terminal 
activities and strategies. This framework runs from the initial planning by the public sector, to 
the split in funding and ownership, selecting an operator, specifying KPIs, setting fees, ensuring 
fair access, and finally to reconcessioning the terminal, managing the handover and 
maintaining the terminal throughout its life cycle. This last point is especially important as 
industry conditions change and the terminal’s role in the transport network comes under threat. 
Incumbent private operators are frequently reluctant to invest in old terminals, while public 
sector planners seek to maintain the quality of their national network. All of the phases 
throughout the terminal life cycle must be understood in order to provide a valid context to 
analysis of intermodal transport which provides input into government modal shift policy 
which itself is used to drive decisions on planning policy at all levels (local, regional and 
national) of government. Each phase of the intermodal terminal life cycle (ITLC) has certain 
key stakeholders and activities associated with it. 
The focus of this paper is on deciding the appropriate competitive strategy for the 
intermodal terminal operator. The goal is to apply the marketing literature to the ITLC in order 
to identify the appropriate competitive strategy to be undertaken at each phase, based on 
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fluctuating markets and competitor behaviour. A template for this approach was provided by 
Shaw (2012), who produced a framework linking the PLC with marketing strategies for each 
phase. Not only can applying the correct strategy at each phase be useful, but anticipating future 
strategies in advance can underpin the success of current strategies and ensure that the terminal 
is prepared for future challenges. 
 The following section introduces the competitive market in which intermodal terminals 
operate, drawing on Porter’s Five Forces and Competitive Diamond as well as the resource-
based view. Section 3 describes the inductive methodology based on literature review and case 
examples and section 4 briefly recaps the main elements of the four phases of the ITLC. Section 
5 applies the marketing literature to these four phases in order to identify the types of strategy 
relevant for each phase, which are then operationalised with empirical examples of each 
strategy. Section 6 discusses the issues arising from the application of each of these strategies 
in the intermodal sector. The final section draws conclusions related to the wider application 
of this framework and provides suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Competition, resources and strategy in the intermodal terminal market 
In order to guide terminal strategy, it is first necessary to understand the terminal’s role in 
the market. Wiegmans et al. (1999) used Porter’s model of five competitive forces to consider 
the intermodal freight terminal market. They discussed barriers to entry and threats of substitute 
goods and which actors exercise power in the market. The industry competitors are other 
terminals operating within the local area, while potential entrants are new terminals that could 
be developed or perhaps old terminals re-entering the market. This is not normally a very 
immediate threat due to high entry barriers such as high investment costs, lack of market 
potential and lack of suitable locations; therefore, the threat of substitutes (i.e. road haulage) is 
far more serious and this is where the usual difficulty for intermodal transport lies. In terms of 
4 
 
negotiating power, there is the negotiating power of suppliers, in this case the owner of the 
terminal facilities, if different from the operator. This is not always an issue as in many cases 
the operator is the owner or if not then they have a fairly stable relationship or concession with 
the owner, and both their interests are in alignment. The negotiating power of buyers is more 
often a challenge, usually rail operators bringing their trains to the terminals or 3PLs managing 
trains. There is also a second level of buyer power because the ultimate buyer of the transport 
service is the shipper, who will use road haulage if rail costs are too high or service quality too 
low, but these concerns are mediated through the rail operator or 3PL through whom the shipper 
contracts their transport services. If the terminal costs are too high or the service quality too 
low then the rail operator cannot ultimately provide attractive rail services to the shipper.  
The appropriate strategy to adopt can also be derived through reference to the resource-
based view (RBV), which seeks ways to exploit asset specificity, whereby resources should be 
non-substitutable. Intermodal terminals are a fairly interchangeable resource unless they can 
offer better service or, ideally, more innovative and unique services. Thus Monios and 
Bergqvist (2016b) showed how moving from the resource-based view to the relational view 
can produce resource heterogeneity from an inter-firm relationship, for example a terminal 
integrating or collaborating with a rail operator and a shipper. 
Ng and Gujar (2009) applied Porter’s Competitive Diamond model to terminals, which is 
an updated version of the Five Forces. They argue that this model is more dynamic, moving 
beyond improving terminal operations by investment in factor conditions towards innovative 
strategies through which a terminal can differentiate itself from its competitors and even 
overcome deficits in factor conditions such as location or capital. As transport decisions and 
requirements become more integrated with the larger logistics strategy of terminal users, better 
customer focus and integrated solutions with rail operators can help terminals embed 
themselves more stably within a customer’s supply chain. Cooperation with competitors and 
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intensive marketing can also be applied, therefore using this lens reveals the importance of 
intermodal terminals taking a proactive stance on marketing strategy, rather than simply 
focusing on terminal efficiency and competing through price against broadly substitutable 
competitors. This kind of innovative strategy is captured by the value net model 
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996), which includes not just competitors, suppliers and 
customers but also complementors, which in this case would refer to an innovative strategy 
such as a terminal setting up a service in conjunction with a rail operator (e.g. sharing terminal 
equipment upgrading costs in exchange for traffic guarantees, providing maintenance and 
storage of wagons and locomotives) and working closely with a shipper (e.g. flexible opening 
hours of the terminal, flexible storage fees, detailed planning/preparation of chassis for pre- 
and post-haulage). 
Sandberg (2013) showed that business models in logistics have internal and external 
components, and Monios (2015a) identified the internal and external governance relationships 
between intermodal terminals and logistic platforms, whereby the importance of external 
relationships with rail operators and ports were revealed to be of crucial importance in 
obtaining competitive advantage. These theoretical developments indicate that earlier models 
such as Porter and the RBV provide a sound basis but require increased nuance in their 
application to specific sectors. In order to be more specific about the kinds of strategies 
available to a terminal operator, it is necessary to understand that the terminal’s needs and 
options change during its life cycle. This paper builds on the use of the product life cycle 
concept by Monios and Bergqvist (2016a) who identified the four phases of the intermodal 
terminal life cycle, by using the marketing literature to identify the kinds of strategies relevant 
at each phase. 
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3. Methodology 
This paper uses an inductive methodology, first to identify the relevant phases of the 
terminal life cycle and, second, to identify from an analysis of the literature and representative 
examples the appropriate marketing strategy for each phase. This paper is, therefore, to some 
extent a conceptual paper, nonetheless based on empirical examples. While cases from the 
authors’ work and others published in the literature are given as examples of each strategy, the 
strategies cannot be induced solely from an analysis of such cases. The selection of cases is 
based on the premise that they provide good illustrations for the respective phases of the 
terminal life cycle. The aim of the paper is to identify and classify each strategy type, using 
brief empirical examples to demonstrate how these strategies are being applied in the 
intermodal sector, but space limitations preclude full case study analysis of all of the eight 
strategy examples. 
One challenge arising from the many different frameworks under which intermodal 
terminals have been analysed in recent years is aligning the different focuses, from location 
studies and transport cost analyses to explorations of policy and planning issues. It is, therefore, 
not possible simply to compare strategies by quantitative analysis of the totality of cases in the 
literature. The issue is not whether x% of terminals use strategy y or x% use strategy z. The 
goal is to use a sound theoretical basis to derive the framework of possible strategies which can 
then be used as the basis of understanding and comparing terminal actions, and as a basis for 
future research exploring individual strategies in more detail. That is why the framework must 
be structured according to the theoretical background from the marketing literature, where such 
strategies have been studied. Many of these issues derive from organisational complexity, 
conflicts in motivations between key stakeholders and changing governance forms between the 
development phase and the operational phase. This paper consolidates previous research and 
develops a research agenda by identifying the key strategies within a new framework; future 
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researchers can then focus on individual relationships that can aid the policy goal of increased 
modal shift to intermodal transport. 
 
4. The intermodal terminal life cycle  (ITLC) 
This section provides a brief overview of the ITLC developed by Monios and Bergqvist 
(2016a). The product life cycle (PLC) concept has been influential for many decades and 
continues to appear in marketing textbooks. While it is a useful concept for description and 
education purposes, concerns exist regarding its ability to predict and forecast as well as guide 
strategic behaviour. The five stages of the PLC concept are development, introduction, growth, 
maturity and decline, and in its most basic form the shape of the curve is determined by sales 
plotted over time (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. The product life cycle 
Source: Authors, based on Kotler & Armstrong (2012) 
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When the PLC model was applied to ports by Charlier (1992), the port life cycle included 
a restructuring phase. Ports can restructure in various ways, such as deepening and lengthening 
berths and adding more and larger cranes to accommodate larger vessels, they can expand the 
size of the terminal if space permits, etc. They can also restructure by “location splitting”, as 
argued by Cullinane and Wilmsmeier (2011); in such a strategy, the development of a satellite 
terminal in the hinterland can extend the port’s operational limits and commercial reach when 
challenged by inadequacies of the existing port location, increasing competition or operational 
constraints. The PLC concept was applied briefly to inland ports in the United States by Leitner 
and Harrison (2001). They renamed the five stages as preparation, establishment, expansion, 
stabilization and reduction. They observed the influences on the reduction phase to be 
competition from other terminals as well as trends forcing operational changes.  
The ITLC takes account both of the PLC model as well as previous applications to ports 
and inland ports. Regarding the identification of stages as well as their duration and major 
influences, the most pertinent to the early stages of intermodal terminals according to Day 
(1981) are the comparative advantage of the new product, the risk to the buyer, barriers to 
adoption and information availability. As time progresses, positive influences include the 
lowering of costs due to industry advances as well as changes to complementary (e.g. cranes) 
and substitute (e.g. road haulage) products. The role of competition is also substantial (e.g. 
nearby terminals, competing rail services). 
In later stages, while marketing and information provision remain essential aspects of the 
intermodal terminal life cycle, they are less crucial than in the traditional PLC concept, because 
issues such as brand saturation, consumer acceptance and search for novelty are not relevant. 
Repeated purchases of intermodal transport services are more likely once the service has 
successfully reached maturity than with other consumer products. Intermodal transport retains 
its appeal primarily through standardisation and reliability. Once it is an established part of a 
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shipper’s transport chain, an intermodal terminal can expect continued sales, and decline is 
more likely to result from operational difficulties, infrastructure problems and changes in the 
market that move supply and demand to other locations. 
The adapted PLC for intermodal terminals is based on the concerns raised in the literature 
regarding the difficulty distinguishing between phases with certainty as well as identifying and 
measuring the main influences. Therefore, the adapted model is not based on unit sales. A 
model could be constructed based on traffic over time, but the purpose of this model is to guide 
strategy, which relates to another criticism of the generic PLC model’s inability to differentiate 
clearly between phases. Consequently, the phases of the life cycle in this model are based on 
observable phases of development and operation rather than on container throughput (Table 1).  
For the case of intermodal terminals, the development phase in the original PLC is 
expanded to cover the planning, funding and development of a terminal. In the case of transport 
infrastructure there is an observable process of planning approval and identifying stakeholders 
and funders from the public and private sectors. The introduction phase in the traditional PLC 
in this case relates to finding an operator for the terminal, including the choice of business 
model and the role of the terminal in the overall transport network.  
 
Table 1. The intermodal terminal life cycle framework 
Product  Port  Inland port Intermodal terminal  
Development  Preparation Planning, funding & development 
Introduction Establishment Finding an operator 
Growth Growth Expansion 
Operations and governance 
Maturity Maturity Stabilization 
Decline Ageing 
Reduction 
Extension strategy  Obsolescence 
Restructuring  
Source: Adapted from Monios & Bergqvist (2016a) 
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The growth and maturity phases in the original PLC model are merged into one because, 
regardless of sales, the issues relating to operations remain basically the same. If maturity for 
an intermodal terminal can be defined, as for ports, as “when it cannot provide more space to 
the customer due to saturation or to impediments that stop further expansion” (Charlier, 2013; 
pp. 599-600), then this is the trigger to enter the fourth phase, defined here as “extension 
strategy”, and incorporating various strategies of restructuring physically, operationally and 
institutionally. The point of “maturity”, then, is not a phase but a trigger for restructuring, 
which, if successful, will lead to another period of success until the next challenge arises. 
The extension strategy phase is based on the restructuring phase from the port life cycle by 
Charlier (1992). Transport infrastructure can be upgraded and service portfolios developed to 
meet changes in the market; on the other hand, the infrastructure will also need to be maintained 
or simply monitored for long periods of time. Where a regular product or service on the market 
will simply be withdrawn and cease to be manufactured/offered due to absence of demand, 
transport infrastructure cannot be removed so easily. Public sector bodies will need to decide 
what to do with such infrastructure and consider whether it should be retained in the public 
stock or the land redeveloped for another purpose. The key features of each phase of the ITLC 
are summarised in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Main features of each phase of the intermodal terminal life cycle (ITLC) 
 Planning, funding & 
development 
Finding an operator Operations & governance 
Long-term or extension 
strategy 
Length 
 
 
3-10 years 1-2 years >10years >15years 
Main 
stakeholders  
 
-Public infrastructure 
stakeholders (e.g. rail 
authorities, planners, etc.) 
-Large shippers 
-Real estate developers 
-Terminal operator 
-Rail operators 
-Ports 
-Public infrastructure 
owner 
-Terminal owner (if 
different to the above) 
-Terminal operator 
 
-Public infrastructure owner 
-Terminal owner (if different 
to the above) 
-Terminal operator 
-Rail operators 
-Public infrastructure 
owner 
-Other public stakeholders 
(e.g. rail authorities, 
planners, etc.) 
-Terminal operator 
Main activities 
undertaken 
 
-Planning 
-Design 
-Funding sought 
-Tendering of construction 
-Construction 
-Designing business & 
ownership model 
-Tendering for operator 
-Designing concession 
agreement 
-Contract development 
-Continuous improvements 
-Responding to changes in 
technology & demand 
-Renewed terminal 
concession 
-Potential  changes in 
business & ownership 
model 
-Potential expansion 
-Ensuring long-term 
strategy and control 
-Potential sale & 
redevelopment of site for 
new purpose 
Source: adapted from Monios and Bergqvist (2016a) 
 
5. Identifying the competitive strategies from the marketing literature  
This section first analyses the marketing strategies provided by Shaw (2012) for each of 
the four phases of the PLC in order to map them across to the appropriate phases of the ITLC. 
Empirical examples of each strategy are then provided, which are discussed and then 
summarised in Table 3. 
The marketing literature is focused on the operational life of the business, therefore does 
not address the PLC development phase. However, the strategies suggested by Shaw (2012) as 
appropriate to the introduction phase actually straddle both of the first two phases of the 
intermodal terminal life cycle, as they are intrinsic to the reason for developing the terminal in 
the first place. The strategy alternatives are penetration or niche. Penetration (Dean, 1951; 
Ansoff, 1965) pursues an aggressive marketing mix for a mass market or a large market 
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segment, while niche (Kotler, 1980; Porter, 1980; McCarthy, 1981) targets a specific market 
segment. In most situations, a niche strategy is more appropriate for an intermodal terminal 
than a penetration strategy. The inherent limitations of rail provision, such as its lack of 
flexibility and responsiveness compared to road transport, mean that only certain kinds of 
product flow are suitable for modal shift to rail. Yet penetration strategies are possible in new 
markets with unexploited potential. 
The marketing strategies proposed for the PLC growth phase are segment expansion 
(Smith, 1956; Ansoff, 1957) and brand expansion (Taubler, 1981). The former aims to expand 
the marketing segment currently served, while the latter aims to add more choice or value 
through additional products or services. Both of these strategies can be applied to the third 
phase of the intermodal terminal life cycle.  
As the maturity phase of the traditional PLC spans both the operational (phase three) and 
extension strategy (phase four) of the intermodal terminal life cycle, the maturity strategies 
advised by Shaw (2012) can be considered relevant to both of these phases. Shaw recognises 
that maturity is commonly managed via a maintenance strategy, but a strategy of differentiation 
(Smith, 1956; Porter, 1985, 1990) can be used in a more aggressive manner. These strategies 
overlap phases three and four of the intermodal terminal life cycle. Late during the PLC 
maturity phase Shaw (2012) notes that a harvesting strategy (Henderson, 1970; Kotler, 1978) 
is likely to become necessary. This involves reducing any marketing strategy to the bare 
minimum required to maintain profit as sales are predicted to decline shortly. During decline, 
the strategy progresses from harvesting to divesting. Therefore, both harvesting and divesting 
will be relevant to the intermodal terminal extension strategy phase. The next step is to 
operationalise the theoretically-derived marketing strategies by providing practical examples 
of each of the relevant strategies (summarised in Table 3).  
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Table 3. Empirical examples of each strategy 
Strategy Phase Description Case example 
Penetration 1/2 Aggressive marketing for a large market, likely 
to be a proactive operator developing a terminal 
to meet an identified demand. Less likely in a 
mature intermodal sector like Europe but more 
likely in a developing intermodal market. 
Hidalgo, Mexico: a new terminal developed by a port 
operator to capture a previously road-based market 
(Wilmsmeier et al., 2015). 
Niche 1/2 Customised service based on vertical integration, 
inclusion of 3PL, open book arrangement. 
Jula/Schenker, Falköping Sweden: open-book 
collaboration between a shipper and a 3PL to establish 
a container shuttle provided a long term contract and 
allowed the terminal owner to invest (Monios and 
Bergqvist, 2015a). 
Segment 
expansion 
3 Invest and upgrade the terminal to encourage 
traffic growth through increased modal shift. 
BNSF Chicago Joliet terminal: huge inland port 
development to support Far East imports for big box 
retailers (Rodrigue et al., 2010).   
 
Brand 
expansion 
3 Expand service offering, storage, maintenance or 
a more tailored integrated model involving rail 
operators and 3PLs. 
DIRFT, Daventry, UK: Centralised inland hub for 
retailer imports expanded to anchor development of 
secondary rail distribution to Scotland (Monios, 
2015b). 
Maintenance 3/4 In phase 3, this is the standard intermodal 
strategy, maintaining current customers with 
little opportunity to capture new traffic due to the 
fixed nature of the sector (i.e. market is limited 
by inherent constraints of the mode). In phase 4, 
maintenance leans towards harvesting, e.g. 
sweating the assets. 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Large terminal serving a capital 
city with several direct port shuttles per day 
(Bergqvist, 2013). 
Differentiation 3/4 In phase 3, this is similar to brand expansion: 
offering added value. In phase 4, it may involve 
a change of offering, perhaps linked to a new 
concession with a better operator. 
ADIF PLAZA Zaragoza, Spain. ADIF were running 
the terminal themselves but it wasn’t successful so 
they concessioned it to a consortium led by port 
terminal operator Noatum (Garcia-Alonso et al., 
2016). 
Harvesting 4 “Cash cow”, sweating the assets . Freightliner, Coatbridge, UK: Ex-public sector 
terminal with 40-year old cranes (Monios & 
Wilmsmeier, 2012). 
Divesting 4 Exiting the market and closing or selling the 
terminal. 
 
Azuqueca, Spain: was a small terminal running for a 
few years but couldn’t grow the business due to short 
distance and fragmentation of flows (Monios, 2011). 
 
Hidalgo, Mexico (Wilmsmeier et al., 2015) is an example of penetration, whereby a new 
intermodal terminal was developed by a port terminal operator (global operator HPH) to secure 
its hinterland by capturing a previously road-based market. Additional benefits were achieved 
by the improved cargo security on the rail shuttles compared to road transport. The niche 
strategy is represented by the case of Jula/Schenker (Monios and Bergqvist, 2015a), which is 
an open-book collaboration (equivalent to a cost-plus contract) between a shipper and a 3PL to 
establish a container shuttle between the port of Gothenburg and the inland terminal in 
Falköping Sweden. This setup provided a long-term contract and allowed the terminal owner 
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to invest, demonstrating the benefits of working closely with the shipper to reduce transaction 
costs and make intermodal transport economically competitive.  
Segment expansion is based on traffic growth through increased modal shift, exemplified 
by the large inland port development by rail operator BNSF at their Chicago Joliet terminal 
(Rodrigue et al., 2010). This strategy was aimed at supporting Far East imports for big box 
retailers, thus securing large scale growth at the terminal. Brand expansion relies on new 
services and integration of the terminal within supply chains, represented by Daventry 
International Rail Freight Terminal (DIRFT), Daventry, the busiest intermodal terminal in the 
UK (Monios, 2015b). This centralised inland hub for retailer imports was expanded twice to 
facilitate growth and anchor development of secondary rail distribution to local DCs in 
Scotland, backloaded with domestic flows from Scottish suppliers into the Midlands NDCs 
(National Distribution Centre).  
A maintenance strategy is the standard approach to intermodal terminal management, 
maintaining current customers with little opportunity to capture new traffic segments due to 
the fixed nature of the sector (i.e. the market is limited by inherent constraints of the mode). In 
phase 4, maintenance leans towards harvesting, e.g. sweating the assets. Both strategies are 
represented by the very large inland terminal at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, handling over 300,000 
TEU loaded inbound containers annually, with the same number of mostly empty containers 
moved back to the port of Dammam (Bergqvist, 2013). This is a large terminal and the only 
site serving a capital city with several direct port shuttles per day and a lack of room to expand, 
thus sweating the assets is the only option until a decision can be made on expanding the 
terminal or providing an additional terminal to split the cargo. 
In phase 3, the differentiation strategy is similar to brand expansion, based on offering 
added value. In phase 4, however, it is more likely to involve a change of offering, perhaps 
linked to a new concession with a better operator. The large logistics platform PLAZA in 
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Zaragoza, Spain has an adjacent intermodal terminal developed by national rail operator ADIF 
(Garcia-Alonso et al., 2016). ADIF were running the terminal themselves but it was not very 
successful in attracting container movements from ports, so they decided to alter the market 
positioning of the terminal by concessioning its operation to a consortium led by port terminal 
operator Noatum. The harvesting strategy is common in ex-public sector terminals developed 
in a very different market situation. This strategy is exemplified by the Coatbridge terminal 
owned and operated by Freightliner, UK (Monios & Wilmsmeier, 2012). Specialising in port 
container shuttles since the early days of containerisation, this ex-public sector terminal was 
part of the management buyout when the company was privatised in the 1990s. Upgraded 
equipment is sorely needed but low margins mean that senior management are reluctant to 
make the necessary large investment with a long payback period. Finally, a divesting strategy 
occurs when a firm exits the market and either closes or sells the terminal. A recent example is 
the small terminal at Azuqueca, Spain (Monios, 2011), which operated for a few years but had 
difficulty growing the business due to short distance and fragmentation of flows and has since 
ceased container traffic. 
 
6. Discussion of strategy selection at each phase of the intermodal terminal life cycle  
6.1 Phase one: planning, funding and development 
Penetration strategies are generally appropriate to situations where the intermodal provider 
is not competing against road but rather competition exists between firms offering the same 
service. It is for firms with large resources, a large market of price sensitive customers, many 
potential competitors and few barriers to entry. Other than the last two requirements, this 
strategy could be considered more relevant for analysis of port or shipping competition, rather 
than intermodal transport. The given example of penetration (Hidalgo, Mexico) is in a 
developing country where the intermodal system is not yet mature. Thus a proactive developer 
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can establish a new terminal to capture known demand that is currently going by road. It also 
helps if there are other factors that can encourage modal shift, in this case one of the main 
drivers being improved cargo security offered by rail shuttles, which proved a successful 
strategy. In mature intermodal markets such as Europe or the United States, pursuing a 
penetration strategy by developing a new large scale intermodal terminal is more difficult.  
By contrast, a niche strategy requires a customised product and targeted marketing efforts 
aimed at a small customer base. Such characteristics can clearly be seen in the personal 
relationships and long preparation of intermodal operators and 3PLs establishing a new 
intermodal service for shippers using rail for the first time. An essential part of this mix is the 
terminal, but it is difficult for the terminal owner to make large investments (either to develop 
the infrastructure in the first place or to upgrade as required for new traffic) without firm 
commitment from the shippers or rail operators, who are rarely in a position to provide it. The 
example given in the previous section (Falköping, Sweden) was an open-book collaboration 
between a shipper and a 3PL to establish a container shuttle based on flexible provision of 
services such as storage and opening hours, and also included an unusually long term contract 
which allowed the terminal owner to invest in upgrading the terminal. Applying this strategy 
even in the development phase allows long term planning and a more suitably designed 
terminal with appropriate capacity. The niche strategy was very successful in this case, 
allowing a small terminal developed by the municipality to grow quickly with high confidence 
for future planning due to close ongoing stakeholder engagement. As we argue throughout the 
paper, this kind of customised service with vertical integration of operations is key to successful 
intermodal transport in most contexts. 
The application of a niche strategy should already be in place during the planning and 
development phase of an intermodal terminal. Instances exist where public sector actors have 
funded or part-funded the development of a terminal without a realistic assessment of the 
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market, not necessarily in absolute terms but in terms of that portion of the market that will 
realistically shift modes. In retrospect, many terminal developers make the mistake of 
unrealistic market assessments. The terminal requires the suitable location and geographical 
attributes in order to serve a market, but it also requires the ability to run services with suitable 
timings and capacity, in addition to offering handling at a low cost. Market studies are required 
and especially discussions with local shippers in order to obtain suitable levels of interest if not 
a definite commitment to use the terminal.  
 
6.2 Phase two: finding an operator 
Penetration and niche are relevant to both phases one and two of the intermodal terminal 
life cycle. As noted above, penetration strategies tend to be less relevant in the intermodal 
sector except in favourable circumstances where demand is high but no terminal currently 
exists. In such a case, there is likely to be demand from an active operator who would develop 
the terminal themselves or work with a public body throughout the planning phase and then 
become the operator themselves. A niche strategy, on the other hand, is likely to be driven by 
the public sector due to marginal demand that is not attractive enough to overcome the barrier 
to entry for private operators, as was the case in the Falköping example just discussed. For such 
a development, the strategy choice covers both phases one and two, because the developers 
should anticipate from early in the process that some kind of tender round will need to be 
conducted whereby an attractive concession package will need to be designed to incentivise an 
operator to take on the terminal. Subsidy may be involved, but it will need to be designed 
appropriately to encourage efficient operations that will attract and retain custom.  
Designing such a concession contract is often difficult (Monios & Bergqvist, 2015b), based 
on agreements regarding, for example, splitting storage fees between owner and operator, 
increasing or decreasing subsidy per container handled, new service development and 
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responsibilities for promotion and marketing. Understanding the terminal’s role in the market 
vis-à-vis competitors, its relationship with external stakeholders (e.g. whether the potential 
terminal operator has its own rail services or has a high degree of collaboration with certain 
rail operators) and its potential for segment or brand expansion (see next phase) are necessary 
in order to produce an appropriate concession contract and select a suitable concessionaire. The 
associated risks and costs must be factored in to the initial decision to develop a terminal, thus 
phase two strategy must already have been anticipated in phase one. Therefore, while the 
strategy option at this phase is perhaps straightforward on the surface, the importance lies in 
its relation with the previous and following phases. The ability to anticipate future changes can 
help ensure a better outcome of the strategy applied during this phase. 
 
6.3 Phase three: operations and contracts  
A segment expansion strategy is based on successfully persuading more firms to shift 
mode. As with the previous strategies, this can only be done in conjunction with rail operators. 
Once the terminal has been successfully introduced and some operators have established 
regular services, such expansion becomes possible. The example given in this paper is the large  
inland port development by BNSF at their Chicago Joliet terminal to support Far East imports 
for big box retailers, so the services to the terminal were underpinned by large regular demand. 
Developing a large site with high capacity both at the terminal and in surrounding logistics and 
warehousing facilities provided a basis for business development through segment expansion. 
This is because, due to the high fixed costs of rail operations, it is always easier to add new 
containers to an existing service that has already broken even than it is to establish a new 
service with uncertain profits. In order to serve this expanding market, expansion may be 
required at the terminal, by adding more tracks or extending current ones, adding new cranes 
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or redesigning the terminal layout to improve efficiency, or improving management practices 
to ensure a smooth flow of traffic.  
Such a strategy may, however, be challenged by two governance issues. The first 
governance issue relates to contractual difficulties (cf. Bergqvist & Monios, 2014) whereby 
delays can be caused due to uncertainties regarding maintenance and so on. The second relates 
to the need for investment for expansion. Most intermodal terminals operate at close to the 
margin already, and if expansion is required then it can be very difficult to secure investment 
from the owner. Public sector owners are reluctant to invest more money, and in many cases if 
the terminal is privately owned then the owner may be a foreign investment company seeking 
regular reliable returns rather than pursuing an expansion strategy. In some ways a region may 
even be considered to be held to ransom by private terminal operators claiming they do not 
have a sufficiently sound business case to release funds from senior management, while the 
current terminal quality deficit is causing delays in traffic and constraining growth for the 
region. Some countries seek to overcome this stalemate through specific modal shift grants, 
but these are often for operations rather than infrastructure investment (cf. Monios, 2015b). In 
order to resolve such a strategic impasse, the business model of the terminal may be changed, 
with potentially a new concession contract based on a modified funding and pricing mix in 
order to lever in public money based on future earnings of the terminal. In such a case the 
terminal moves to the fourth phase of the life cycle where an entirely new business model and 
market placement is designed which eventually moves the terminal back to phase two. 
Therefore, it is important to understand as early as possible in the life cycle, but at least by 
phase three, that successful operations will lead to the desire to expand the market segment, 
which in many cases cannot be done under the same business model that was established during 
phases one and two, therefore it can be a good idea to anticipate such developments and where 
relevant build them into the initial concession contract. 
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The next available strategy during the third phase of the ITLC is brand expansion. As 
already discussed in the niche strategy, intermodal terminals are a clear example of the need to 
offer value added services in order to attract new customers and to retain current ones, not just 
in simple terms of expanding the offer but even to construct a viable package in the first 
instance. The key to successful intermodal transport is integration of operations. A brand 
expansion strategy can add choice by offering new departure times or destinations, but service 
expansion is more likely. This can take the form of services at the terminal such as container 
storage, cleaning and maintenance or empty depot services. The example given above (DIRFT, 
Daventry, UK) is a centralised inland terminal for retailer imports in the UK, at a location 
where most large retailers have their NDCs located. In the past they distributed from here by 
road to regional DCs and to stores. The DIRFT terminal has expanded twice and key to this 
expansion has been development of secondary rail distribution to Scotland. This was developed 
over several years through close collaboration between a few large retailers, 3PLs acting as 
intermediaries and rail operators transporting the containers. Government modal shift subsidy 
was also involved as it is difficult to compete on cost with road at this distance. Through 
providing a tailored package through the collaboration of several stakeholders, this secondary 
rail corridor has proved a success and more users have since joined these services. The role of 
3PLs to coordinate these flows has been instrumental to the scheme’s success, providing an 
integrated logistics package whereby the terminal works with a forwarder or 3PL to manage 
flows, offer last mile trucking and provide real-time information on cargo location and 
condition throughout the transport chain. Intermodal terminals can also be used as buffers in 
the supply chain, allowing a customer to make larger orders but not need to store all the inbound 
goods at their own warehouse. 
A maintenance strategy is very suitable to the intermodal market, which relies on 
maintaining existing customers rather than seeking many new customers, due to the often rather 
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static nature of the market and the service. Indeed, during phase three this is the standard 
intermodal strategy, maintaining current customers with little opportunity to capture new traffic 
due to the fixed nature of the sector (i.e. the market is limited by inherent constraints of the 
mode). The example given above (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) was of a large terminal serving a 
capital city with several direct port shuttles per day, but without room to expand therefore the 
focus is on managing an overcapacity terminal to the best of its ability and seeking new 
strategies from planners on additional terminals to handle increased flows. 
A strategy of differentiation is less likely in intermodal transport, except when considered 
as merely a continuation of the brand expansion strategy just discussed, whereby the terminal 
offers added value where possible, usually in conjunction with a rail operator. Therefore, were 
a terminal operator to establish a new relationship with a rail operator to bring a new service to 
the terminal, this could be considered a differentiation strategy. Equally, ending a concession 
and selecting a new terminal operator with better contacts or an integrated service portfolio 
could also be considered as differentiation, which is more relevant to the fourth phase. This 
was the case in the example given above (ADIF PLAZA Zaragoza, Spain), whereby the 
incumbent public terminal operator had not achieved the success they had hoped and decided 
to concession the terminal to a private operator. Interestingly, the selected operator was a 
consortium led by a port terminal operator, which provided the degree of vertical integration 
often necessary to a successful terminal. In this case, integrating with the port terminal 
anchored port flows from those ports which enabled a successful strategy of differentiation.  
 
6.4 Phase four: extension strategy 
Maintenance and differentiation strategies can be followed in both phases three and four. 
Given the difference in activities between the two phases, following these strategies during 
phase four tends to be more proactive as there is a pressing need during the extension phase to 
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refocus the business model of the terminal due to changes in the market. Therefore when 
applied in phase four rather than phase three maintenance and differentiation strategies lean 
closer to the other two distinct strategies available during this phase: harvesting and divesting. 
For example, the decision on maintenance at this phase could be more about sweating the asset 
and obtaining the most from it with least investment rather than a genuine long-term 
maintenance strategy, while divesting may be not simply closing or selling a terminal but 
reconcessioning it. 
It is not uncommon that the extension strategy phase will include renewing a terminal 
concession which may in some cases be allied to a change in ownership or business model, as 
in the ADIF example just discussed. This may then return the terminal back to phases two and 
three, starting again with a new operator with their own approach to the niche market and their 
own views on how to expand their segment or brand. So this kind of differentiation may be 
more proactive as opposed to a terminal that had followed a natural progression from phase 
one to two to three.   
Shaw (2012) uses the term “cash cow” when describing the harvesting strategy, and there 
is no doubt that some intermodal terminals are managed according to this strategy. It is 
particularly evident in the case of terminals that were developed by the public sector in areas 
with a lack of competition and later privatised. Indeed, this is noticeable in many privatised 
industries, where the new owner simply sweats the existing assets until no more profit is 
possible. At this stage the asset can be abandoned or public support requested. As shown in the 
example provided above (Freightliner, Coatbridge, UK), an old terminal developed during the 
period of a nationalised rail operator and privatised in the 1990s is still using the same 
equipment and is in dire need of new funds. The strategy has been successful in the sense that 
the terminal continues to operate successfully and even attract some new traffic segments 
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(some of the secondary retail flows discussed in the DIRFT example above), but is not ideal 
from a system perspective. 
 There is thus a clear link between the phases of maturity and decline (according to the 
traditional PLC) or operational phase and extension strategy phase (according to the ITLC). If 
the maturity phase is not handled correctly then decline will be the result, and indeed this relates 
back to the development phase. Public sector terminal developers need to be aware of the long 
life of intermodal terminals, and remain cognisant of the fact that such a phase will inevitably 
be reached and private operators or owners are unlikely to make large investments in transport 
infrastructure.  
Shaw (2012) notes that, even in a declining market, a small number of providers may be 
able to survive by serving a niche market. This observation reveals the tension between 
harvesting and divesting in the ITLC, as, after losing larger traffic flows, some small terminals 
may be able to return to handling a regular small flow that is well suited to rail transport (e.g. 
a large local shipper with regular demand) and thus likely to continue using the terminal even 
if other factors change, for instance declining efficiency due to old equipment. The question is 
whether the operator continues to provide the service or chooses instead to divest. In such a 
case, the public sector needs to make a decision regarding the long-term strategy. Do they 
invest in upgrading the terminal, thus arresting a decline and underpinning long-term operation, 
do they allow the terminal to shut down but safeguard the site for future use, or do they allow 
the land to be sold for another use, thus losing the strategic site that cannot be replaced due to 
increasing development on strategic central sites resulting from other pressures such as need 
for housing. The example provided earlier (Azuqueca, Spain) was a small terminal running for 
a few years but was unable to grow the business due to short distance and fragmentation of 
flows so the operator exited the market. However, the terminal infrastructure remains in place 
and the site has a 45-year lease from the local authority, thus it is ready to be reactivated if a 
24 
 
suitable business model with sufficient traffic can be established. That is why the fourth phase 
of the ITLC is considered as a long-term or extension phase, because regardless of the state of 
the market or the number of sales (which is the defining metric according to traditional PLC 
approaches), the terminal infrastructure remains in place and continues to require strategic 
decisions. 
The choice of extension strategy links closely with decisions made at earlier phases, and 
can in some cases return the life cycle back to an earlier phase, analogous to the change in 
operator already discussed above which takes the terminal from phase three back to phase two. 
A change in ownership of a successful terminal severs the link with phases one (development) 
and two (concession to operator), as the terminal is no longer within the control of its original 
developers. This could therefore be considered a divesting strategy, in that the owner is 
divesting themselves of the asset, although the terminal remains in operation, and indeed the 
original owner may actually develop a new terminal (thus returning to phase one). It is not 
unheard of for a public sector owner to sell a successful terminal to its private operator and use 
the money to finance a new terminal. This situation highlights how the life cycle approach 
helps to guide strategy for terminal developers, by anticipating such potential scenarios and 
planning in advance how they would deal with them and under what conditions certain strategy 
decisions such as divesting will be made. This also guides investment from interested 
stakeholders as they can face the future with greater certainty. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The findings in this paper are relevant for academics, policymakers, planners and terminal 
managers. For academics, the strategic framework helps guide understanding and analysis, 
while for policymakers and planners it aids future planning. The framework also allows 
terminal managers to integrate their short-term operational decisions with the longer-term 
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strategic and tactical focus of the other stakeholder groups. Overall, it allows all of these groups 
to coordinate their plans in an integrated manner. This leads to significant policy implications 
regarding terminal development, in which we include both high level policymakers and local 
transport and land-use planners. The ways in which the public sector supports the initial 
terminal development or subsidises later investments must be based on an integrated life cycle 
plan underpinning a long-term understanding of the terminal’s changing market position 
throughout its life. Fundamental to the best use of this framework is to provide policymakers 
with a temporal perspective, the ability to anticipate future needs and thus reduce delays and 
uncertainties at key moments. The remainder of this section outlines the nature of these 
challenges and the aid to policymakers and planners that can be derived from the use of the 
framework. 
While the analysis in this paper is focused on the intermodal terminal, the viability of an 
individual terminal is determined in large part by the economic viability and competitive 
performance of intermodal transport as a transport solution. Barriers to modal shift are well 
known and relate to issues such as distance, service quality, handling charges, asset utilisation 
and balancing traffic flows. These are the responsibility and concerns of the service providers 
rather than the terminal operator, but understanding of the terminal life cycle can provide input 
into interpreting such cost analyses. The economics of the intermodal terminal change over its 
life cycle. Business models, cost structures and charging principles defined in concession 
contracts strongly influence the prices charged by the operator to the terminal users and hence 
determine the ability of transport operators to attract shippers from road to rail. Understanding 
the business model and the contractual situation as it changes throughout the life cycle should 
improve the ability to construct the appropriate strategy at each phase for both public and 
private stakeholders. 
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It is often the case that public investments are made in terminals based on feasibility studies 
incorporating analysis of traffic flows that may depend on who controls the traffic and their 
equipment and service requirements, or be determined by the role of local large shippers. The 
appropriate strategy adopted by the main stakeholders will be different in each case. While 
major decisions by stakeholders relate mostly to the development phase, changes throughout 
the life cycle such as selecting the initial operator or changing to another operator at a later 
time will affect the selection and success of such strategies. 
The long-term phase or extension strategy of a terminal has not been addressed thus far in 
the literature. The value of the life cycle approach is to identify this phase as a strategic priority 
for terminal stakeholders at any phase, and to highlight particularly the importance of 
anticipating this phase during the development process. Optimistic stakeholders during the first 
phase are unlikely to consider whether and under what conditions they would sell the terminal 
in later years and how this position may change depending on whether the terminal is a success 
or a failure. Plans will not be put in place for needed investment and upgrades and institutions 
and personnel are highly likely to have changed by that time. Having such a strategy in place 
can be a major help to all stakeholders, particularly policymakers and planners who may 
otherwise have to make a strategic decision on needed investment without due preparation and 
warning. 
This paper has focused on marketing strategies and market positioning, based on an 
understanding of the characteristics of terminal assets and how to obtain competitive advantage 
in what is to some degree a homogeneous market of substitutable terminals. Understanding that 
intermodal transport requires a niche strategy based on brand expansion through integration 
with rail operators can help the planning phase by anticipating such needs and building it into 
the concession contract, as well as anticipating the relevant cost structures that may require 
certain types of subsidies or indeed even disagreements over issues such as storage fees. Such 
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anticipation should also enable the terminal planners to expect the need to expand the terminal 
through a segment expansion strategy and consider how this will be dealt with some years in 
the future. Likewise, the potential need to manage a declining terminal either through renewed 
investment, a new concession under a different business model or through closing down should 
also be anticipated early in the life cycle. Anticipating the likelihood of an operator sweating 
the asset through a harvesting strategy can enable public planners to expect the need for 
renewed investment or even perhaps a regulatory approach to incentivise operators to continue 
to maintain equipment and provide good service. Anticipating future strategies in advance can 
underpin the success of current strategies and ensure that the terminal is prepared for future 
challenges. 
 The crucial outcome of the above strategy analysis and the area where future research is 
required is that terminals should not be treated as interchangeable assets whose value is based 
only on their quality of handling derived primarily from investment. Rather, terminal success 
is built on innovative strategies to obtain competitive advantage by focusing on partnerships 
with external partners such as rail operators, transport service providers such as forwarders and 
hauliers, 3PLs and shippers. These relationships will be key to the terminal’s viability at all 
four phases of its life cycle, and suitable strategies should be designed to encourage such 
activities. Therefore, when planners are designing a financial model during the first phase and 
a concession contract during the second phase, they should anticipate future investments, profit 
shares, risk and reward involving not just the terminal itself but the key external stakeholders. 
All strategies throughout the life cycle should be geared towards this essential need to position 
the terminal in the market, underpinning its ability to compete with road haulage, attract 
customers and hence achieve policy goals of modal shift. 
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